$ cat .env
# detect · exploit · patch: Zero days in the code the internet trusts
# mbedTLS drops early data, reports delivered · 15 Mar 2026
BLACKHOLE="Receipt signed, goods never delivered, nobody goes looking. A client puts its first request in the opening packet (a payment instruction, a meter reading) and mbedTLS completes the handshake having received none of it. Four bytes from anyone on the network path are enough, and the client, told its early data was accepted, never sends it again."
# client pops its own early secret · 8 Apr 2026
ONEBYTE="IETF fixed an identifier length. wolfSSL enforces that bound at every parse site but one, and the exception is ServerHello, so a man-in-the-middle on the plaintext phase of TLS 1.3 sets a length the client runs on. Against a client offering a pre-shared key, a subsequent comparison becomes an oracle, and the client's early secret leaves the device."
# Seven stacks accept forbidden signatures · 18 Apr 2026
NOMARK="Everything a certificate authority sells is a restriction it trusts somebody else to honour. Mark a key encryption-only and the marking is worth whatever the software reading it decides to make it worth, which across TLS 1.3 turns out to be two incompatible answers. One certificate; to half the client libraries in production it is a valid server credential, to the other half a forgery. Nothing either endpoint can be configured to do reconciles that. The buyer of the certificate cannot make the restriction bind, the authority that signed it cannot make it bind, and an attacker needs only a client on the lenient side of the line. IETF did not leave this to taste: the requirement reads MUST. One that half an ecosystem declines to implement has stopped being a rule and become a suggestion — and the certificate keeps its restriction printed on the front, where it reassures whoever reads it."
# libssh runs command attacker wrote · 7 May 2026
WAVED="AES-GCM is the SSH cipher whose whole job is catching tampering: change one byte in flight, the receiver's tag check fails, and the session dies. Read that check's result with the wrong comparison and the cipher quietly degrades to AES-CTR — confidentiality with no integrity behind it — for every session. The attacker still cannot read the session, so they can only rewrite what they can already anticipate; unattended automation, running the same command every night, predicts itself."
# Seven TLS 1.3 libraries never rotate session keys · 8 Apr 2026
FOREVER="A backup runs overnight. A database replica streams across a region. A trading session holds its socket from the opening bell. Ordinary, sanctioned, encrypted. TLS 1.3 was built to retire each key as the bytes pile up and derive a fresh one, so a stolen key opens what follows it and nothing before. Seven libraries never do it. The connection runs for a day, a month, a year on one unchanging secret, and when that secret falls, the attacker doesn't just read the history. The key that decrypts is the key that forges; they can inject into the live stream and take the session over. Not what follows the theft. All of it, back to the handshake."
# wolfSSL forgets a name constraint one tier up · 4 May 2026
BREACH="Cross-organisation trust delegation leans on X.509 name constraints to hold a delegated certificate authority to an agreed set of names --- a partner's authorisation to sign on the organisation's behalf is limited to an agreed domain, and IETF requires every certificate below it to stay inside that domain, at any depth. wolfSSL honours the constraint directly above a leaf, but loses it across an unconstrained sub-CA one tier up — so a partner who controls that tier can mint a leaf for any hostname at all, trusted by every wolfSSL client that trusts the organisation."
# Haskell trusts every name in the chain · 24 Apr 2026
HOLLOW="Haskell reaches the network through hs-tls: Warp and warp-tls under web servers, http-client under API clients, unikernel and mesh stacks on both. HTTP/3 arrives by QUIC. Every one hands the server's chain to a single faulty X.509 validator. An organisation that lets a partner issue certificates writes into the delegation which names the partner may issue for. That limit is what makes a delegated hierarchy safe: consortium roots, enterprise authorities signing for subsidiaries, device fleets attesting under a vendor's authority. A Haskell client honours the delegation and ignores the limit — the partner can issue for any name at all — complete break of the boundary."
# plink dies on one byte from the wire · 8 May 2026
DUPFREE="plink is PuTTY's command-line SSH client: the one a Windows scheduled task calls at three in the morning, the one a backup script dials out with. PuTTY long predates OpenSSH on Windows, so a great deal of automation that nobody has revisited since it was deployed still runs through it. An on-path attacker shrinks the RSA key an honest server sends to one size too small, and plink crashes. No host-key prompt, no rejection message, exit 134. The backups stop that night, and no one notices for months — until someone needs a file that was never saved."
# ocaml-tls forgets its own legacy checks · 18 Apr 2026
CERTMASK="MirageOS unikernels, Robur deployments, and OCaml applications pick ocaml-tls. Its legacy bouncer turns clientAuth away at the door; its current one opens that door and welcomes with application data. The library shipped a second cert-validation walker with TLS 1.3 and forgot to wire checks."
# Shell runs script rewritten in flight · 10 May 2026
HEADWATERS="curl installs software; server fetch, pipe into shell, execute:"
# Server boots remote disk rewritten in-flight · 8 May 2026
MIRAGE="A disk feels like the most solid thing a computer owns — a slab of storage bolted into the box. A virtual machine's disk, though, need not be nearby. QEMU, the engine under most of the world's Linux virtualisation, can open a disk image straight off a remote host, fetching blocks across the wire."
# Certificate compression bomb at control systems · 24 Mar 2026
BURST="A wall of screens, floor to ceiling: A power grid drawn in light, every substation and every line alive. A dim room, operators at their consoles, the low hum of a place that is never dark. One of them opens a web page. Nothing looks wrong. Then a screen blinks out. Then the next. Before they can react the wall is black, the operators blind. Out in the night, the grid runs on. No one is watching it."
# Firefox crashes on wire it asked for · 24 Mar 2026
SHATTER="Germany's BSI ranks Firefox ESR the only browser on its Mindeststandard für sichere Web-Browser that meets every requirement with no extra hardening. The federal workstation runs it, the embassy front desk runs it, the PIV smartcard signs cables through it. For seven years the NSS library underneath has carried an extension counter that resets at handshake start and never again. Flood one connection with CertificateRequest messages and it corrupts a pointer; the next free() takes down the process the handshake runs in, and every tab with it."
# Unfettered access to classified material · 17 Mar 2026
WALKTHROUGH="A stranger walks in off the street, wants entry to the embassy filing room, guard demands identification, system doesn't. Anyone can walk in, remove material, manipulate it, even add their own documents. No checks."
# Document signed, signature unchecked · 19 Mar 2026
DEADCODE="Botan is a general-purpose C++ cryptography library shipping a policy module for Germany's BSI TR-02102-1 algorithm recommendations, with Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity engineers among its largest contributors. Across releases 3.0 through 3.10 it ships a function that verifies the signature on a revocation record, ships a unit test that only ever asks that function to accept, and routes around it at runtime. Any TLS server stapling its own revocation record, or anyone on the wire between client and responder, lifts the revocation gate by signing the bytes with a key the authority never held."
$ ls findings/ # 15 zero days
- BLACKHOLE # mbedTLS drops early data, reports delivered
- BREACH # wolfSSL forgets a name constraint one tier up
- BURST # Certificate compression bomb at control systems
- CERTMASK # ocaml-tls forgets its own legacy checks
- DEADCODE # Document signed, signature unchecked
- DUPFREE # plink dies on one byte from the wire
- FOREVER # Seven TLS 1.3 libraries never rotate session keys
- HEADWATERS # Shell runs script rewritten in flight
- HOLLOW # Haskell trusts every name in the chain
- MIRAGE # Server boots remote disk rewritten in-flight
- NOMARK # Seven stacks accept forbidden signatures
- ONEBYTE # client pops its own early secret
- SHATTER # Firefox crashes on wire it asked for
- WALKTHROUGH # Unfettered access to classified material
- WAVED # libssh runs command attacker wrote
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