Smyth, B., Ryan, M., Kremer, S. & Kourjieh, M. (2009) Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols. In Proceedings of the fourth Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security (WISSec'09). Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
This work has been superseded by the conference version.
We present a symbolic definition that captures some cases of election verifiability for electronic voting protocols. Our definition is given in terms of reachability assertions in the applied pi calculus and is amenable to automated reasoning using the software tool ProVerif. The definition distinguishes three aspects of verifiability, which we call individual, universal, and eligibility verifiability. We demonstrate the applicability of our formalism by analysing the protocol due to Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta and a variant of the one by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson (implemented as Civitas by Clarkson, Chong & Myers).